I am indeed honoured by the invitation to deliver the Lloyd Roberts Lecture. In the forty years since this lecture was established, it has been delivered by many of the most distinguished of our doctors, scientists, men of letters, architects, churchmen, lawyers and statesmenan order which is fortuitous and not intended to indicate personal preferences or contemporary judgments of public esteem. Many of them have chosen to speak of the impact of their professions on the wider community, and in this lecture I propose to discuss an allied theme -Medical Ethics and the Public Weal.
Wlhat is Medical Ethics? In the practice of medicine knowledge and competence are not enough; the quality of service which the doctor renders to his patient reflects what the ancients called 'caritas' -that primeval sympathy and tenderness of man for man, and' also his personal integrity. This was recognized nearly 2,500 years ago by that most significant of the codes of medical conduct, the Hippocratic Oath, which enjoined the physician to swear: 'I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment, but I will never use it to injure or wrong them.' A patient places his health and his future in the hands of his doctors and entrusts them with confidences both intimate and personal. Medical ethics is concerned with this trust. It involves moral judgments, judgments of right and wrong in professional conduct and duty; it is not concerned with technical offences per se, such as negligence, for which the law provides a remedy, except when the technical offence involves a breach of the moral obligations of the doctor. Nor does it embrace Meeting November 301964 Lloyd Roberts Lecture the manners, customs or usages of medical practice which may properly be referred to as 'medical etiquette'. Medical ethics is concerned with a doctor's duties and obligations and with jealously guarding the privileges which sometimes the law, and sometimes custom, bestows on the doctor. Since what is right and what is wrong in this field are value judgments and are concerned not simply with wrong-doing but with degrees of wrong-doing, it is proper that the judges of professional misconduct should be those experienced in the practice ofmedicine -'professional brethren of good repute and competency', to borrow the phrase coined by Lord Justice Lopes in 1894. This was recognized by the Medical Act of 1858 which assigned disciplinary functions to the General Medical Council (GMC) which was established by that Act to maintain a Medical Register. Until 1951, the Council acted as a whole in the exercise of its disciplinary duties. Since then these have passed (Medical Act, 1950) to a smaller Disciplinary Committee elected by the Council from amongst its own members.
The Doctor's Responisibilities A doctor's professional responsibilities are firstly to the patient entrusted to his care, secondly to the society in which he lives, thirdly to the professional brethren with whom he works, and fourthly to humanity in general. This is not a rigid order of priority but the welfare of the patient is almost invariably paramount; medicine in a democratic state would never allow the doctor to subordinate the claims of an individual patient to the abstract claims of society in general, or indeed to the theoretical claims of another patient. Yet it cannot be maintained that in all circumstances the claims of the individual patient should prevail; there must be times when the good of society outweighs the patient's immediate demands. For example, the compulsory notification of certain infectious diseases is accepted as necessary whatever inconvenience may be caused to the patient who must be isolated, or to the contact put in quarantine.
Responsibility to his Patient
The responsibilities of a doctor to his patient are both legal and ethical. The doctor contracts to give his patient skill, care and attention of a proper standard, and negligence to do so may be a civil wrong for which damages can be recovered by the injured party when there has been a lack of due care and attention.
But lack of technical competence or skill, though it may attract a legal penalty, does not of itself bring the guilty doctor before the Disciplinary Committee of the GMC. Indeed, the Council has held that it is precluded from enquiring into charges of technical incompetence; and the Medical Act expressly excludes the erasure of any registered person 'on account of his adopting or refraining from adopting the practice of any particular theory' of medicine. And this is surely right, for the practice of medicine involves judgments whose validity must always be matters of opinion. No remedial agent or measure is without its hazards and to be over-cautious may result in lack of achievement. If there were an ever-present fear of being called upon to answer for the consequences of exercising one's judgment, the doctor might be tempted to play for safety and use simple rule-of-thumb methods. But if the GMC in the exercise of its disciplinary powers does not concern itself with technical incompetence, breaches of a contract to provide proper attention may well attract professional censure of all degrees up to the most severe, namely, removal of licence to practise. For example, if a doctor promises, often repeatedly, to call and see a patient on his National Health Service list who is reported to be seriously ill and he fails to do so, and as a result the patient dies or suffers permanent crippling, or is otherwise seriously discomforted, it might well be determined that this conduct comes within the definition of 'infamous'.
Infamous Conduct in a Professional Respect
The word 'infamous' has been criticized, notably in the successful appeal by Felix against a determination of the General Dental Council. Many adjectives might describe the varying degrees by which a man has fallen short of the moral standards required of him by his profession; conduct may be unbecoming, unworthy, questionable, disgraceful, discreditable, disreputable, shameful, scandalous, shocking, outrageous, and so forth. But the phrase 'infamous conduct in a professional respect' has statutory sanction. It is that used in the first Medical Act of 1858 and retained in the Act of 1956, and was defined in 1894 by Lord Justice Lopes as follows:
'If a medical man in the pursuit of his profession has done something with regard to it which will be reasonably regarded as disgraceful or dishonourable by his professional brethren of good repute and competency, then it is open to the General Medical Council, if that be shown, to say that he has been guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect.' It is sometimes overlooked, particularly by the public, that medical ethics is not concerned with infamous conduct as such, but only with infamous conduct in a professional respect. As Lord Esher observed, 'the question is not merely whether what the medical man has done would be an infamous thing for anyone else but a medical man to do. He might do an infamous thing which would be infamous in anyone else, but if it is not done in a professional respect it does not come within the section', i.e. under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the GMC.
Why then has it been regarded as infamous conduct in a professional respect for a doctor to be repeatedly convicted of drunkenness or of being in charge of a motor car when under the influence of drink? It is just because such convictions indicate habits which may be a danger to patients and may bring discredit on an honourable profession.
A Man's Person is Sacrosanct
In the eyes of all men of integrity, and of the mind ofthe common law of this country, as Lord Devlin observed, a man's person and his property are sacrosanct. The doctor is unique in that his work brings him into physical contact with his patients so that temptations and opportunities may arise which lead to charges of 'infamous conduct in a professional respect'. The Hippocratic Oath recognized a doctor's special privileges:
'Into whatsoever house I enter I will do so to help the sick keeping myself free from all intentional wrongdoing and harm especially from fornication with woman or man, bond or free.' And in another context Hippocrates emphasizes the hazards of this relationship: 'Patients put themselves into the hands of their physician and at every moment he meets women, maidens and possessions, very precious indeed. So to all these self-control must be used.'
It is not, let me repeat, adultery or fornication per se which is the offence; it is the abuse of a doctor's special access to a patient which constitutes the offence. It is perhaps an over-simplification to say that 'a doctor's mistress may be his patient, but his patient must not be his mistress', for if misconduct occurred after the doctorpatient relationship had ceased, infamous conduct in a professional respect would not thereby be excluded.
In the past dozen years, doctors erased from the Register following a determination of the Disciplinary Committee have had the right to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council against that decision, and although as I earlier observed Lord Justice Lopes in his classic definition of infamous conduct laid the responsibility for its determination upon 'professional brethren of good repute and competency' the judgments delivered in such appeals have supported and sustained the Disciplinary Committee's decisions and illuminated them in model judgments. A few years ago a doctor advanced as his defence to a charge of infamous conduct in a professional respect, that although he committed adultery with a wife and mother whose husband and children were still his patients, the wife had ceased to be his patient before the adultery took place. But Lord Denning in upholding the decision of the Disciplinary Committee would have none of this. He commented thus: 'A doctor gains entry to the home in the trust that he will take care of the physical and mental health of the family. He must not abuse his professional position so as, by act or word, to impair in the least the confidence and security which should subsist between husband and wife. His association with the wife becomes improper when by look, touch, or gesture he shows undue affection for her, when he seeks opportunities of meeting her alone, or does anything else to show that he thinks more of her than he should. Even if she sets her cap at him, he must in no way respond or encourage her. If she seeks opportunities of meeting him, which are not necessary for professional reasons, he must be on his guard. He must shun any association with her altogether rather than let it become improper. He must be above suspicion.
'It was suggested that a doctor who started as a family doctor, might be in a different position when he became a family friend. His conduct on social occasions was to be regarded differently from his conduct on professional occasions. There must, it was said, be cogent evidence to show that he abused his professional position. It was not enough to-show that he abused his social relationship. This looks very like a suggestion that he might do in the drawing room that which he might not do in the surgery. No such distinction can be permitted. A medical man who gains the entry into the family confidence by virtue of his professional position must maintain the same high standard when he becomes the family friend.' (P.C. Appeal No. 69 of 1960.) This may well appear to some to be an unduly strict appraisal of what constitutes infamous con-duct in a professional respect, but it is evidence of what the informed lay person considers should be the standards of conduct in the practice of medicine. The abuse may arise, of course, with an unmarried patient and it is not difficult, in my view, to imagine circumstances in which there may be a gross breach of professional privilege and the duty it carries, where there was improper conduct between a doctor and a person not his patient.
There is another aspect of the doctor-patient relationship in which there has recently been renewed interest, because a psychiatrist, involved as a witness in a divorce case,was threatened with imprisonment because of the present state of the law if he refused to reveal what passed between him and his patient.
Professional Secrecy
Both the pagan and Christian versions of the Hippocratic Oath include the paragraph: 'Whatsoever in the course of practice I see or hear (or even outside my practice in social intercourse) that ought never to be published abroad, I will not divulge, but consider such things to be wholly secret.' The need for a doctor's secrecy in certain circumstances is clear. It is to protect his patient and to ensure that the patient is not deprived of treatment or protection because of the fear that what he tells the doctor will be revealed. It may be that the patient suspects he is suffering from venereal disease, and shame, or disclosure to his wife (who would then have grounds for divorce), prevents him from seeking treatment; or a woman may before marriage have had an illegitimate child and the disclosure of this may well wreck a happy home. If diagnosis and treatment are to be of the highest standards no relevant facts in the past history must, for fear of exposure, be withheld. Also it may be that a patient, weakened by sickness or tortured by his disease or his fear of impending dissolution, makes disclosures or confessions to his doctor which he may well regret having made if he recovers.
Whereas in many countries confidential communications between patients and doctors are privileged, in this country the doctor is compelled in a court of law to disclose by the judge's direction any confidence or secret knowledge which may repose in him or face imprisonment for contempt of court. The doctor may protest or suggest that the answer be given in private or in writing to the judge, but if the judge insists on an answer, the doctor must accede or suffer the consequences. Lord Mansfield's dictum of 1776 still holds: 'If a surgeon was voluntarily to reveal those secrets, to be sure he would be guilty of a breach of honour and of a great indiscretion; but to give information in a Court of Justice, which, by the law of the land, he is bound to do, will never be imputed to him as any indiscretion whatever.' The cynic points to the fact that at common law it is confidential disclosures to legal advisers only which are privileged from compulsory disclosure in Court. The Roman Catholic priest in relation to the confessional has a factual, if not a legal, right of privilege but this is based upon an attitude which was that of Sir Thomas More when on the scaffold he uttered: 'I die the King's good servant, but God's first.'
Grave personal and social ills may follow these obligatory disclosures of the doctor, and there is increasing agitation to change the law in this country so as to afford the doctor the same privileges as the lawyer in respect of professional secrecy. With this view many would concur, but not necessarily in the sense that both lawyer and doctor should have absolute privilege, but that both should recognize that there may be circumstances when the greater good, as determined by judicial authority, may demand disclosure. I have heard no valid reason given for denying the doctor what is conceded the lawyer. There are many situations which do not permit of the application of a rigid, inflexible rule of secrecy, and where in the opinion of many the claims of the individual cannot be allowed to place in jeopardy the welfare and even the lives of large numbers of his fellow citizens. I have earlier referred to the compulsory notification of certain infectious diseases, and no doctor is or should be immune from the penalties of infringing these or similar statutory obligations. If a doctor knows that an epileptic patient has obtained a job as an engine driver where, if he has a fit, there may result grave loss of life and limb, is it not the doctor's moral and social duty to persuade his patient as cogently as possible that he should seek alternative employment where innocent persons will not be placed in jeopardy? And, moreover, if the patient refuses or fails to do so, should not the doctor make a disclosure in guarded terms to an interested party? I doubt not that some doctors will hold that the patient's secret should be inviolate in all circumstances; that breaking the confidential relationship which exists between doctor and patient may do greater public harm than the good which may possibly result; that to break this confidence at any time is the first step towards surrendering to authority the rights of the individual patient. But the thin end of this wedge is already in place, and should a grave disaster occur from failure to disclose, will not the public outcry lead to still further restriction of the individual's right to be the citadel of his own disabilities, even when these may, if not revealed, affect the general good? In matters of right or wrong there are surely not all whites or all blacks. W.hich doctor would resist ensuring that his daughter did not marry one of his patients suffering from active syphilis even if after other methods failed this could be done only by revealing his patient's secret? There are claims for medical secrecy which the ordinary man in the street and his friends would undoubtedly regard as morally outrageous, and no disciplinary tribunal would be likely to give such claims any encouragement. On the other hand, there may well be occasions when a doctor improperly discloses confidential information obtained from a patient, which might justifiably warrant an inquiry into a charge of infamous conduct.
Misprision ofFelony
There is another aspect of professional secrecy which has led to much debate and discordant views. It arises when a doctor is consulted in circumstances in which he knows that a serious criminal offence, a felony, has been committed, for example, when he is called to see a patient on whom a criminal abortion has been carried out. If an ordinary law-abiding citizen comes to know of such an offence it is his duty to report it to the police or a magistrate, or anyone in lawful authority, and to disclose all the material facts of who did it, and where and when, which are known to him. If he conceals his knowledge he is guilty of an offence known as 'misprision of felony' and is liable to punishment by fine and imprisonment. A recent judgment in the Nouse of Lords' affirms that this offence, which is more than five hundred years old, still remains the law. But what is the position of a doctor? Should he inform the police if he knows and not merely suspects, when consulted by a patient, that the patient's condition shows that a crime has been committed. Lord Dawson declared that a doctor is bound to protect a patient who has come to him in a confidential relationship, and that greater harm would be done to the public than any possible good that could result in the vindication of justice by giving the patient away. Other doctors, however, have believed that in such circumstances the claims of society overrule the claims of the individual and that the police should be informed. Mr Justice Hawkins differentiated between a doctor who informed -against an abortionist (which would in his view be 'a monstrous cruelty') and one who 'might come with a wound which it might be supposed had been inflicted on him in the course of a deadly I [1961] 3 All E.R. 34 struggle. It would be a monstrous thing if the medical man might screen him and try to hide the wound which might be the means of connecting the man with a serious crime'. But trying to hide the wound which might prevent the man being connected with a serious crime is an active act of assistance which would make the doctor an accessory after the fact, for which the doctor could claim no privilege. The situation, however, in regard to misprision of felony appears to have been clarified in favour of the doctor by words used by Lord Denning in the judgment to which I earlier referred. He said: 'Non-disclosure may be due to a claim of right made in good faith. For instance, if a lawyer is told by his client that he has committed a felony, it would be no misprision in the lawyer not to report it to the police, for he might in good faith claim that he was under a duty to keep it confidential. Likewise with doctor and patient, and clergyman and parishioner.' But this might not be the final word, for in delivering his concurring judgment in the same case Lord Goddard observed: 'It is very easy to poke ridicule at the offence and say that it obliges people to inform against a boy stealing an apple. The law is nowadays administered with dignity and common sense. And if it is said it obliges a father to inform against his son, or vice versa, I would answer that, in the case of a really heinous crime, be it so.' Perhaps, the doctor is not so protected as Lord Denning's judgment infers! Responsibility to his Profession andProfessional Brethren I now turn to the doctor's obligations to his profession and to his professional colleagues. A doctor must be a man of integrity and good character. In the words of Claudian he must 'ponder not what he might do but what he should do and let regard for duty control his mind'. Before he is admitted to a medical school or obtains his licence to practise he must produce a certificate of good conduct and character from a person or persons of standing. Again, if he is guilty of offences outside the ambit of his professional activity, offences which are discreditable not only to himself but to his profession, e.g. convictions for forgery, fraud, theft, false pretences, indecent behaviour, &c., or where within the professional ambit he perverts his skill for illegal purposes, e.g. the performance of non-therapeutic abortion, his peers may regard his offences as so dishonourable or disgraceful as to merit the gravest professional penalty of erasure from the Register. The words of Francis Bacon are here apt: 'I hold every man a debtor to his profession, from the which as men do of course seek to receive countenance and profit. so ought they of duty to endeavour themselves, by way of amends, to be a help and an ornament thereunto.'
Medicine not 'A Business ofthe Market Place'
Hippocrates commented that medicine is not 'a business of the market place'; the practice of medicine is a profession and vocation and not a trade. This does not imply that doctors should not 'seek to receive countenance and profit' but that rules must be designed to enforce certain standards for the better protection of the members of the medical profession and for the better service of the public. To the latter end, the profession assumes certain responsibilities for the competence of its members and for the quality of their work; and it prohibits certain kinds of conduct on the ground that though these may be profitable to the individual they are calculated to bring into disrepute the profession to which he belongs.
Traders also serve the public, but their prime motive is usually to pursue their pecuniary selfinterests within such limits as the law allows. Thus the essence of business is the financial return which it offers its shareholders. The essence of a profession is that though men enter it for the sake of their livelihood the measure of their success is the service which they perform not the gains which they amass. Of course, successful doctors may grow rich, but their prime purpose should be not the making of money but the making of health. Hence doctors recognize that there are certain practices which they must not pursue however large the fee offered for them because they are unprofessional. To quote R H Tawney in his book, 'The Acquisitive Society': 'To idealize the professional spirit would be very absurd; it has its sordid side. But there is all the difference between maintaining a standard which is occasionally abandoned, and affirming as the central truth of existence that there is no standard to maintain. The meaning of a profession is that it makes the traitors the, exception by upholding as the criterion of success the end for which the profession, whatever it may be, is carried and subordinating the inclinations, appetites and ambitions of individuals to the rule of an organization which has as its object to promote the performance of function.'
Advertising, Canvassing, Fee-splitting, False Pretences, Fraud It is for these reasons that advertisement may be a perfectly legitimate competitive weapon in business but not in a profession. The reputation of a doctor should depend upon his ability and skill.
Hence the practice in this country, as in many others, is to condemn, for example, advertising which is intended to attract patients or to promote a doctor's own professional advantage; canvassing for patients; fee-sharing with consultants (dichotomy); improperly obtaining money from patients, who are not required to pay for treatment or for certificates, or from authorities, such as the National Health Service, for services not rendered. It is undesirable, though it may not be improper, that doctors have a financial interest in certain preparations which it may be their duty to recommend to patients; but the doctor's financial gain must not override his judgment, and certainly if a doctor has a financial interest in an institution it is better that he disclose the fact to the patient.
The Professional Offence ofAdvertising
The proscription of advertising has given rise to widespread misunderstanding. The offence of advertising arises when a doctor through whatever medium he may choose, be it books, press, radio or television, draws attention to his professional attainments or skill, or has procured or sanctioned such publication primarily or to a substantial extent for the purpose of obtaining patients and promoting his own professional advantage, or if he knowingly acquiesces in such publication by others, or is associated with or employed by persons or organizations which procure such publications. The offence derives from the accepted professional principle that it is the doctor's personal skill, assiduity and care of patients, and not his own promulgation in any form of his abilities, or his depreciation of his fellow practitioners, which should attract patients.
The 'Medical Directory' has potted biographies which are supplied by doctors themselves. 'Who's Who' provides similar and often more extensive biographies of a selected group. Both these volumes are freely accessible to the public. Doctors publish papers in medical journals, or write textbooks and monographs which may increase their chances of securing an appointment of higher status and pay, and since such journals and books are not barred from the public they may receive attention in the lay press, though not through their authors' agency, and thus patients may seek their advice. Again, doctors not infrequently write articles or letters to the newspapers, give talks on the radio or appear on television without incurring professional censure.
What then are the principles which the Disciplinary Committee apply in determining whether there has been an ethical offence? These were enunciated in relation to books and articles, though they may be regarded as of more general application, by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in upholding a decision of the Disciplinary Committee (P.C. Appeal No. 35 of 1960) . Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest said: ' The Disciplinary Committee were entitled to have regard to the content of the written material, the form in which it was written, and the selected media for its publication in forming conclusions as to what were the purposes which animated the writer. The Committee were entitled to consider whether a desire to give information about a subject and to direct attention to such subject could have been achieved without directing attention to the personal and unique performances and abilities of the writer. It must be recognised that professional medical men may be amply justified in publishing books and articles and in publishing them in their own names. By their writings they may be making invaluable contributions to medical science and to learning. They may be disseminating useful knowledge. They may be helping their fellow practitioners. They may be advantaging a wider public. It must, however, be recognised that by their writing they may inevitably and indeed justifiably attract notice. This may redound to their professional and to their pecuniary advantage. It may well be that in some cases the hope that some legitimate meed of personal advancement will result, may find its place amongst the motives in writing, and may be the spur to command the industry that the task may require. But after this has been said it can definitely be said that within the profession the line between the kind of publication that is unobjectionable and the kind that is objectionable should present no difficulties of recognition for any reasonable practitioner. Examples may be given. On the one side of the line there might be a book or an article which is an exposition of a particular subject either written as a textbook for medical students or practitioners or written impersonally in order to give information to the general public. No exception could be taken to such publication. As an example on the other side of the line there might be a book or an article an essential theme of which is the praise and commendation of the skill and abilities of the writer himself with an express or implied suggestion that his successes in dealing with cases show that potential patients would do well to have recourse to him. That would be advertising.'
Here Lord Morris reiterates where the responsibility for the decision rests. It is a doctor's 'professional brethren of good repute and competency' who will decide on 'the line between the kind of publication that is unobjectionable and the kind that is objectionable'. Again, a doctor may advertise by displaying a notice or circulate an announcement, even in connexion with his own practice, which exceeds the limits customary in the profession.
No Fixed, Rigid 'Code' of Medical Ethics A consideration of the problems concerned with advertising reveals why the General Medical Council has not attempted to formulate, as have some other countries, a detailed code of conduct, nor in the light of the Council's experience of over a century would it be possible so to do. The Council contents itself with calling attention to the high standards of ethical conduct demanded of doctors and, by the issue of pamphlets from time to time, it gives examples of a number of types of offence or misconduct based on cases which have been decided by disciplinary enquiry. Thus are 'the ways of many sinners made plain'. I have instanced but a few, and the examples given in these pamphlets cannot be all-embracing. There may well be other infamies as yet unknown or unimagined by which a doctor falls short of the moral standards required of him. Indeed, the principles maintained by the Disciplinary Committee lie close to the nature of English law.
As Lord Devlin observed in an earlier Lloyd Roberts lecture, 'We have no code of law . . . In England the law is made up from judgments in decided cases and from sundry statutes.The latter are usually only passed to meet a particular contingency and Parliament rarely attempts to codify any branch of the law. In England it is broadly true to say that litigants make the law, for the law is made by decided cases and every case needs a plaintiff ... English law is designed to be administered by men who prize common sense above logic and symmetry.' I have no hesitation in claiming for my colleagues on the GMC that for them the principles of medical ethics are the handmaids of reason and experience, designed to be administered by men who prize common sense no less. There is, as I have said, a large corpus of precedents for their guidance but each complaint must be judged afresh in regard to all the circumstances of the alleged offence. There can be no certain prediction of the finding of the Disciplinary Committee, or if the doctor is found guilty of the offence, whether he will be erased. Even adultery with a patient, though 'infamous conduct in a professional respect', does not inevitably lead to erasure.
False Certification
Society, that is the State, grants special privileges to doctors. They are trusted to sign death certificates where false certification or lack of proper care in certifying could mask murder. They are trusted to sign certificates of ill-health or unfitness for work which might, if false, result in the disbursing wrongly of the monies or com-modities of the State. They are trusted to sign prescriptions for drugs of addiction and thus have an opportunity to profit by selling such drugs at extortionate prices. It is because the State and other authorities place trust in the doctor that the issuing of untrue or misleading certificates, even when there is no question of their issue benefiting himself, may bring him within the scope of the Council's disciplinary jurisdiction.
Responsibility to Mankind And finally, there are many problems of medical ethics which concern humanity as a whole; for example, the ethics of human experiment on which in this country the Medical Research Council amongst others has recently given guidance. The abuse of medical ethics in this field was especially highlighted by the conduct of some doctors during the Nazi regime.
Summary and Conclusion I have sought in this lecture to stress that the concern of medical ethics is essentially the public weal. The preamble to the Medical Act of 1858 embodied its prime purpose, namely, 'that persons requiring medical aid should be enabled to distinguish qualified from unqualified practitioners'. To this end the Act instituted the Medical Register. But knowledge and skill in medicine are not the only criteria for admission to the Register. The practitioner to be registered and to remain so has to show that he justifies the privileges which are reposed in him, and that his conduct in the discharge of his professional duties and obligations matches up to these privileges. Medical ethics lays its emphasis throughout on the professional aspects of misconduct. There are offences leading to convictions which have no professional implications, for example, failure to provide a dog or wireless licence, or exceeding the speed limit. The criminal offences which attract the attention of the Disciplinary Committee must involve professional misconduct or must so derogate or detract from the high regard in which the medical profession is held as to impugn its integrity. Adultery, advertising and canvassing are, however, not offences against the law of this country and yet for the reasons adumbrated they may attract to a doctor the extreme professional penalty of erasure from the Medical Register.
It is proper that a doctor be judged by his professional brethren of good repute and competency, and essential that they should have regard to all the relevant, including the mitigating, circumstances, in deciding whether the doctor 15I is guilty of a breach of medical ethics and whether its nature and gravity justify a finding of 'infamous conduct in a professional respect' and whether erasure from the Medical Register should follow.
The penalties imposed by the Disciplinary Committee are not punishments in a retributive sense though its decisions may be followed by serious hardship for the doctor and his dependants. When a doctor is found guilty of an offence and judgment is postponed this also is not retributive punishment; the postponement is to give him an opportunity to provide evidence that the habits which led to the offence and which may prove dangerous to patients have been overcome.
The doctor whose name has been erased from the Register may be restored when he has purged himself of his offence and proved himself worthy of reinstatement amongst the members of an honourable profession which the public can rightly trust. In brief, the overriding purpose of medical ethics is the protection and safety of the public. It translates into action the Ciceronian precept, undimmed by time, 'Salus populi suprema lex est' -the noblest motive is the public good.
